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The resiliency, dedication, and mental 
toughness that the Chosen Few soldiers 
displayed, even though medevac assets 
and air support were lacking, are 
commendable� At Wanat, they were 
on their own in enemy territory and 
outnumbered by enemy insurgents just 
meters outside their fighting positions� 
Yet they continued to fight, looking 
out for one another in a way that only 
those in close combat can understand� 
In combat, soldiers fight for one another 
more than anything else—they do not 
want to let their buddies down�
The book raises the question: How 
can the world’s most powerful military 
put soldiers in harm’s way with only 
limited resources and support? Lieuten-
ant Colonel Bill Ostlund, battalion 
commander of the 2/503 Infantry, 
noted that the entire “brigade had 
six Apache attack helicopters, and at 
times as many as four were down for 
maintenance� It was taking way too long 
to get the wounded off the battlefield�” 
Wanat was a travesty, not just another 
bureaucratic oversight; the U�S� military 
establishment clearly was surprised 
and could not react quickly enough�
The July 2008 battle of Wanat itself was 
horrific, and the fallout devastating for 
all� Those who survived were tormented 
by guilt, wondering what more they 
could have done� The Army, for its 
part, conducted several investigations, 
released the findings, and then amended 
the findings� Careers were ruined, and 
some leaders left the Army� Even more 
tragic, families lost faith in the chain 
of command and the Army leadership, 
because it seemed that no one was 
held accountable for the circumstances 
surrounding and the casualties result-
ing from the battle of Wanat�
There are important lessons to be 
learned from reading about these brave 
soldiers of the Chosen Few� Zoroya 
makes the following point: “Just as 
military teachers for decades strolled 
with students across the battlefields at 
Gettysburg, Shiloh, and other famous 
engagements to learn the art of war, 
they [should] also virtually tour Wanat 
in the years ahead�” These are lessons 
that should not have to be relearned 
each time U�S� forces engage in combat 
operations, and that is why the battle of 
Wanat will be studied by young men and 
women at the U�S� Military Academy 
and in college Reserve Officers’ Training 
Corps (i�e�, ROTC) detachments across 
the United States for years to come� 
Zoroya has done a masterful job of 
highlighting the brave soldiers of the 
Chosen Few� This book is a must-read 
for military leaders at any level�
THOMAS J� GIBBONS
No Room for Mistakes: British and Allied Sub-
marine Warfare 1939–1940, by Geirr H� Haarr� 
Barnsley, U�K�: Seaforth, 2015� 450 pages� $49�95�
No Room for Mistakes is a meticulously 
researched and well-written history of 
the British and Allied submarine ser-
vices from 1939 to 1940� The relatively 
short time span the book covers allows 
the author, Geirr Haarr, to delve into 
granular detail, often giving week-
by-week, even day-by-day, accounts 
of particular submarines and their 
travails fighting the German navy in the 
eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean�
The book’s first chapter follows the 
tragic story of HMS Thetis during the 
first half of 1939� Shortly after it left 
the Cammell Laird shipyards near 
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Liverpool, England, a series of mistakes 
coupled with some very bad luck left 
the ship lying on the floor of the Irish 
Sea� Only a few survivors made it to 
the surface to be rescued� Eventually, 
Thetis was salvaged, repaired, and sent 
back into service� At first, this particular 
story might seem out of place; after 
all, the German military was nowhere 
near Thetis when it sank� Yet after a few 
chapters it is clear that Thetis’s story 
artfully sets the tone for the entire book�
In 1939, there really was no room for 
mistakes� Everything about submarine 
warfare in the early years of World 
War II was experimental, and the 
margin for human error was paper-thin� 
Hull designs, weapon systems, and 
navigational equipment had undergone 
evolutionary leaps since the early 
U-boats of World War I—and crews had 
to learn how to operate them on the fly� 
Although crews learned quickly and 
often achieved remarkable results, the 
cost of not learning quickly enough, as 
with Thetis, was high� Questions such as 
the optimal depth and spread for firing 
torpedoes, equipment configurations, 
and maneuvering tactics remained 
unresolved throughout this period�
Even bigger unknowns surrounded 
operational employment� Some in 
the British Admiralty argued that 
submarines should be used primar-
ily for surveillance; others argued for 
minelaying or direct engagement of 
surface vessels� After some early success 
seemed to settle the debate in favor of 
surface engagements, the German navy 
became increasingly adept at thwarting 
submarine attacks through the use 
of convoys and air cover� Increasing 
British losses from these improved 
German tactics restarted the debate 
on how submarines should be used�
Difficulties for the submarine service 
multiplied after the successful German 
invasions of Norway and France in 
1940� British submarines now found 
themselves under threat of air attack 
from the moment they left home, and 
there were few neutral or allied ports 
outside the home islands where a captain 
could seek refuge if his boat suffered 
battle damage� As the summer of 1940 
advanced and nights became shorter, it 
was also increasingly difficult for boats 
to charge their batteries on the surface 
without being detected and driven 
underwater� These circumstances frayed 
the nerves of even the most experienced 
sailors—a point Haarr drives home with 
his excellent narration and extensive use 
of ships’ deck logs and crew diaries�
No Room for Mistakes is appropriate 
for both junior and senior personnel 
in the military as well as enthusiasts of 
military history� Although submariners 
will have the easiest time relating to 
the material, individuals from every 
branch and service will be inspired by 
the bravery of British submarine sailors� 
Additionally, the level of detail in No 
Room for Mistakes makes it an invalu-
able resource for anyone researching a 
particular aspect of military operations 
or naval tactical developments during 
the early World War II period�
My favorite aspect of No Room for Mis-
takes is Haarr’s extensive use of primary 
sources, including diaries, logs, journals, 
and photographs� These materials help 
make the historical account of this 
period much more poignant and remind 
the reader of the high human cost of 
war at sea� No Room for Mistakes is an 
excellent addition to a personal library 
and is recommended particularly to 
anyone with an interest in naval history�
CHARLES T� LEWIS
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